Participation, Deliberation, and We-thinking by Pettit, Philip
Participation, Deliberation, and We-thinking
Philip Pettit
One of the most inﬂuential arguments for the value of political participation is
Carole Pateman’s early book Participation and Democratic Theory (Pateman
1970). In this essay I explore the ideal with which she was concerned, identify
a problem for its implementation, and then describe a strategy under which
the problem can be overcome. The strategy makes a connection between the
participatory ideal of democracy and what has come to be known as the delib-
erative ideal of democracy; speciﬁcally, it connects with the sort of delibera-
tion that involves what I describe, for want of a better term, as we-thinking.
My focus will not be on democratic process in the large-scale context of an
electorate; participatory democracy is very hard to achieve in that context.
Following Pateman’s lead, I will be exploring the prospects for participatory
democratic processes in smaller scale contexts. Where she concentrated in
particular on industrial democracy, however, I shall be concerned more gener-
ally with the possibility of democratizing a variety of decision-making units,
ranging from workplaces to boardrooms, from civic associations to formal
committees, from government departments to religious groupings.
In the ﬁrst section of this paper I look at the content of the ideal of partici-
patory democracy and, in the second, at the context of group behavior for
which it is an ideal. In the third section I identify the problem that arises for
the ideal; in the fourth section I show how a certain sort of decision-making
process can solve this problem; and in the ﬁfth and ﬁnal section I comment
on the deliberative we-thinking that this inevitably involves. Such we-thinking
is not much discussed in the literature on deliberative democracy but assumes
the ﬁrst importance in any genuinely participatory theory.
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The Content of the Participatory Ideal
What does it mean to make a decision-making process participatory? At the
least, it means that the process should give everyone a say, and ideally an
equal say. This argues at a ﬁrst level that whatever form the decision-making
process takes over different issues, it ought to be one that has everyone’s ap-
proval. It ought to be unanimously endorsed as a way to make decisions in
the relevant context, local or global; it ought to be a process that could be
vetoed by anyone but is actually vetoed by none.
This unanimitarian requirement might be extended from approval of the
decision-making process itself to approval of each decision made. The require-
ment might be not just that the procedure for making decisions is one that all
approve, but that it is a procedure under which everyone must approve of
each decision made. By all accounts, however, this is not going to be a feasible
arrangement. The circumstances of politics, even in relatively nonpluralistic
environments, are such as to make disagreement inevitable (Waldron 1999).
And that means that a decision-making group that is committed to unanimity
is unlikely to be able to get its business done.
The absolutely standard line, in view of this consideration, is that the way
forward for participatory democracy is to require unanimous approval for a
non-unanimitarian mode of decision making: usually, for a majoritarian
mode, or for a majoritarian mode that puts in certain protections against
majority abuse. This line is already to be found in thinkers as different as
Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1994) and Jean Jacques Rousseau ([1750, 1755,
1762] 1973).
Hobbes’s name is not naturally associated with the ideal of democracy, but
there are at least two respects in which he displays democratic credentials.
First of all, he insists that the establishment of a sovereign who can speak for
the people should be unanimously accepted among the members. ‘‘A multi-
tude of men are made one person, when they are by one man, or one person,
represented so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude
in particular’’ (Hobbes [1651] 1994, 104). And second, he allows that the sov-
ereign might in principle consist of a committee, in particular a committee-
of-the-whole, and that such a committee ought to make its decisions by ma-
jority voting. ‘‘And if the representative consist of many men, the voice of the
greater number must be considered the voice of them all’’ (104).
If Hobbes is unusual, that is mainly because he puts few if any effective
limits on the power of the sovereign, including the sovereign people. Rousseau
argues, ﬁrst, that the committee-of-the-whole is the only legitimate sovereign,
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not just one possible sovereign among many; and second, that as the sovereign
it is limited to legislating for the people in accord with rule-of-law constraints
and cannot take on executive or other governmental duties. He follows
Hobbes, however, in thinking that everyone in a society ought to approve of
establishing the assembled people as this sort of legislative sovereign and that
that assembled body ought to make its decisions by majority vote. He writes:
‘‘one law . . . needs unanimous consent . . . the social compact. . . . Apart
from this primitive contract, the vote of the majority always binds all the rest’’
(Rousseau [1750, 1755, 1762] 1973, bk. 4, chap. 2).
The Hobbes-Rousseau template for participatory democracy might be ap-
plied, not just to the society as a whole, but to any decision-making site. Gen-
eralized in this way, it involves two steps. First, members are to endorse
unanimously the decision-making procedure proposed for the site. And, sec-
ond, that procedure is to give pride of place to majority voting, even if it
is constrained to protect individual members against what would count, by
unanimous agreement, as majority abuse. We may take the need for con-
straint as granted and describe the ideal, in a phrase, as unanimously accepted
majority rule. There are different things that majority rule can mean, but I
ignore that ambiguity here; as things turn out, it won’t matter for our pur-
poses.
If this model of participatory democracy is to have any chance of com-
manding allegiance, at least two stipulations should be explicitly added; they
normally go without saying, and will do so in the remainder of this paper. The
ﬁrst is that those who make the decisions at any site should include everyone
who lives or operates there as a member; what it means to live or operate at a
site, of course, will vary between different cases. And the second is that those
decision makers at any time should not be irreversibly constrained by the
decisions of previous generations.
At each time, then, the voting members should include all the members
there are. And at each time the members should be able to reconsider and, if
this is thought sensible, reverse the decisions of the past membership. The
ﬁrst provision guards against synchronic control of some members by others,
the second against diachronic control of the members at one time by the
members at earlier times. This second provision need not mean that every
decision should be regularly renewed, as in Jefferson’s idea of having each
generation make its own constitution (Rubenfeld 2001, 18–19). Rousseau
([1750, 1755, 1762] 1973, bk. 3, chap. 9) takes a more sensible line. ‘‘Yester-
day’s law is not binding today; but silence is taken for tacit consent, and the
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Sovereign is held to conﬁrm incessantly the laws it does not abrogate as it
might.’’
The Context in Which the Ideal Applies
What sort of enterprise is meant to be governed by the ideal of participatory
democracy? There are two starkly contrasting answers in the literature. Ac-
cording to one account, the enterprise is that of determining for a range of
choices the option that answers best in each case to the preexisting prefer-
ences of the parties in the group. According to the other, the enterprise is that
of determining how best some goals can be advanced by the members of the
group or by their representatives.
Under the ﬁrst account, participatory democracy is cast as a method for
aggregating the preference orderings of members, now on the options in this
choice, now on the options in that. Under the second account, it is taken as a
method for aggregating the judgments of the members on issues to do with
the speciﬁcation, ordering, and urgency of the goals; on the opportunities
available for pursuit of those goals and the problems arising from tensions
between their demands; and on the best means to adopt, or the best agents to
recruit, in advancing the goals. Under the ﬁrst account, the group is cast as a
passive beneﬁciary of whatever choices will be made, and the aim is to make
sure that the beneﬁt maximizes preference satisfaction overall; the idea is that
that aim will be best advanced by polling members on what they each most
want. Under the second account, the group is cast as an active choice-making
agency, and the aim is to get members to form a common mind on the judg-
ments required; the idea is that members can best do this by pooling their
views on the matters the group has to address.
Given that participatory democracy is taken here as a method that can be
used at many sites, not just in an electoral context, we have to conceive of it
as a way for members of the relevant group to pool their views, not just as a
way of polling them for their preferences. Think of those on the shop ﬂoor
who participate, as under Pateman’s model of industrial democracy, in deter-
mining the priorities of the ﬁrm. Think of those in a department of state who
participate in deciding on how to implement a set of policy goals. Or think of
the members of a voluntary association who participate in organizing the
annual activities of the group. In none of these cases can participatory democ-
racy be cast as a means for maximizing preference satisfaction. Its primary
function will be to ensure that the requisite pattern of decision making will
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be implemented in a way that gives each member a say, ideally an equal say,
in forming the judgments that guide decision.
There is a sense, of course, in which any pattern of choices on which the
members converge in such a case will show what in some sense they most
prefer. But this should not distract us from the distinctive character of the
exercise. If as an individual agent one adopts a means for advancing some
goal on the grounds that it is the most efﬁcient way of doing so, then there is
a sense in which this will show what one most wants. But whatever the choice
shows about what one most wants, the grounds for making it will not be that
it produces the most satisfaction of want; one will not have decided upon it
under that aspect. There will still be an intuitive contrast between the case
envisaged, then, and a case where one does look as such for the way to best
satisfy certain antecedent wants (Pettit 2006). A similar contrast obtains be-
tween the exercise in which people try to come to a common mind on how
best to specify or promote certain goals and the exercise in which they try to
determine which of various options answers best to their antecedent desires.
If they form the judgment that such and such an option is the thing to do,
and then enact it, we can say that that was the action that appealed to them
most, or that they wanted most. But the appeal of the action will have been
that it was the best means to their ends, not that it answered best to their
antecedent desires.
One way of emphasizing the contrast between the two sorts of cases men-
tioned has a particular prominence in the discussion of deliberative democ-
racy (Sunstein 1993). This is to point out that while there is a sense in which
preference satisfaction may be achieved under both procedures, the relation-
ship between the preferences and the procedure is quite different in each case.
In one, the preferences are brought to the table and the question raised is how
best to satisfy them. In the other, the question of what judgments to form is
brought to the table and preferences materialize in the course of resolving
that issue. The preferences are the input to the procedure in the ﬁrst case and
the output of the procedure in the second.
In view of the various sites at which it is supposed to apply, I shall assume
that participatory democracy is meant to be an ideal for the second sort of
case, not the ﬁrst. It is an ideal for how the members of a decision-making
group should pool their judgments, not an ideal for how members should be
polled on antecedent preferences. This makes good independent sense any-
how, as it sharpens the contrast between participatory, policy-making democ-
racy and the indirect, electoral form of democracy in which personnel are
selected to make policies elsewhere.
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A Problem for the Ideal
When democracy is cast as a matter of aggregating preference orderings, then
notoriously, it runs into conﬂict with Kenneth Arrow’s famous impossibility
theorem (Arrow 1963). This shows that there is no satisfactory voting proce-
dure that can guarantee it will produce a rational preference ordering over
the options in a group choice, on the basis of the rational preference orderings
of members. Take transitivity of preference, which consists in the fact that if
A is preferred to B, and B to C, then A is preferred to C. Arrow shows that
transitive input orderings are liable to generate an intransitive group order-
ing, if the voting procedure has to satisfy certain intuitively attractive con-
straints: if it has to work for all inputs, treat no one as a dictator, select any
option that is universally preferred to alternatives, and remain constant even
as irrelevant alternatives are introduced.
Do we escape this sort of aggregation problem in insisting that participa-
tory democracy is not about the aggregation of preference orderings but about
group decision making? I want to argue that even if we do escape this and
related problems (Coleman and Ferejohn 1986), we have to face a distinct
issue of aggregation, indeed an issue that is arguably more general in charac-
ter (List and Pettit 2004). This is a problem, not in the aggregation of prefer-
ence, but in the aggregation of judgment. It does not focus on the difﬁculty in
putting together our individual orderings of the options in a given choice.
Rather, it turns on the difﬁculty of putting together the different sets of judg-
ments that we will each have to form in the course of considering a series of
choices that we face as a group.
Take any range of choices that we may confront as a group, whether at the
same time or over a stretch of time. Selecting an option in any one choice will
require a number of judgments. In each case there will be a question as to the
various options available as alternatives, the relevance and urgency of differ-
ent goals, the extent to which those goals can be simultaneously serviced by
different options, and the relative merits of the different options as means of
realizing the goals; and this latter issue will usually ramify into a variety of
subordinate issues about causal connections, likely consequences of the differ-
ent options, and so on. Assuming that we are each to have a say on what the
group decides in any such choice, and in the range of choices overall, we will
each need to form a personal judgment on every question raised, and so we
will each have to develop quite a complex body of judgments.
The bodies of judgment we form will inevitably be quite different, however,
even if we consult one another in the course of forming them; the burdens of
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judgment, as John Rawls (1993) calls them, will ensure that we go different
ways. And so there will be a problem as to how our different bodies of judg-
ment are to be aggregated into a single body of judgment: one that the group
can act on when it acts as a whole—if it ever does this—and one that those
authorized to speak or act in its name can be required to follow.
It may seem that we can wheel in the participatory ideal of unanimously
endorsed majority voting to solve this problem of aggregation. After all, the
obvious thing to do in determining the group view on any issue, say whether
or not it is the case that p, is to take a vote among the members and to let the
group view be determined by the majority view among the membership. But
this, it turns out, we cannot do—at least not with any assurance that the group
will be able to perform as a rational decision-making center.
The problem is one that I have described elsewhere as the discursive di-
lemma (Pettit 2001, chap. 5; 2003c). Assume that if a group is to be able to
perform as a decision-making center, then it must be able to ensure consistency
in its judgments; it must be sensitive to the recognition of inconsistencies, even
if it occasionally slips on this front. This is a reasonable assumption since the
group that is insensitive to the inconsistency of its judgments on issues related
to action will be unable to make a rational decision on what to do. The problem
that arises with the majoritarian aggregation of judgments on a range of issues,
in particular a range of issues that are logically connected with one another, is
that individuals with perfectly consistent sets of judgments on those issues can
vote for a set of group judgments that is quite inconsistent.
Let me illustrate the problem schematically, to begin with. Consider a
group of three agents, A, B, and C. Imagine that under the pressure of decision
and action, they have to form judgments, now on whether p, now on whether
q, now on whether r, and yet again on whether p&q&r. All but A might vote
for p; all but B for q; all but C for r; and, consequently, none for p&q&r: each
would reject it because of rejecting one conjunct. These votes would have the
group holding that p, that q, that r, but that not-p&q&r. The position would
be as represented in the following matrix:
p? q? r? p&q&r?
A No Yes Yes No
B Yes No Yes No
C Yes yes No No
Majority Yes Yes Yes No
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This problem can be readily illustrated with real-life examples. Consider an
issue that might arise in a workplace, among the employees of a company:
say, for simplicity, a company owned by the employees (Pettit 2001, chap. 5).
The issue is whether to forego a pay rise in order to spend the money thereby
saved on introducing a workplace safety measure: perhaps a guard against
electrocution. Let us suppose for convenience that the employees are to make
the decision—perhaps because of prior resolution—on the basis of considering
three separable issues: ﬁrst, whether there is a serious danger of electrocution,
by some agreed benchmark; second, whether the safety measure that a pay
sacriﬁce would buy is likely to be effective, by an agreed benchmark; and
third, whether the pay sacriﬁce involves an intuitively bearable loss for indi-
vidual members. If an employee thinks that the danger is sufﬁciently serious,
the safety measure sufﬁciently effective, and the pay sacriﬁce sufﬁciently bear-
able, he or she will vote for the sacriﬁce; otherwise they will vote against. And
so each will have to consider the three issues and then look to what should be
concluded about the pay sacriﬁce.
The pattern here is exactly as in the case with p, q, r, and p&q&r. And as in
that case, the employees may have views such that if the majority view on each
issue is to ﬁx the group view, then the group will end up with an inconsistent
set of views. Let A, B, and C represent the employees; if there are more than
three employees, the problem can still arise. A, B, and C may hold the views
ascribed in the following matrix, generating the inconsistent majority set of
views represented in the bottom row.
Serious Effective Bearable Pay
danger? measure? loss? sacriﬁce?
A. No Yes Yes No
B. Yes No Yes No
C. Yes Yes No No
Majority Yes Yes Yes No
It may seem that the participatory ideal might be altered, so that what is
required is not a procedure of majority voting but a procedure of some other
kind. But this avenue does not hold out much promise. The problem is that,
even with wholly consistent individual voters, no voting procedure can be
guaranteed to generate a consistent set of judgments on a logically connected
set of issues if it is to satisfy three conditions. These are, ﬁrst, that it work
under any variation in the input bodies of judgment; second, that it treat
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every individual as an equal in the voting procedure, giving no one a casting
vote and allowing no one a dictatorial position; and, third, that it treat every
issue in its own right as an issue to be determined by the members’ views on
that question, not by what their views on other issues imply. We may refer to
those conditions as universal domain, voter anonymity, and voting systematic-
ity. There is now a formal theorem to the effect that no procedure satisfying
those conditions can guard against the sort of inconsistency illustrated by the
discursive dilemma (List and Pettit 2002; for references to later theorems see
List and Pettit 2005). This theorem shows that it is impossible for a voting
procedure to guarantee to deliver a complete, consistent set of judgments as
the output from complete, consistent input sets, and at the same time conform
to universal domain, voter anonymity, and voting systematicity.
This impossibility is threatening—perhaps more threatening than the Arro-
vian impossibility—so far as it hangs over any group, as the group continues to
make decisions through time and builds up a record of judgments. For as the
group commits itself to more and more propositions, say by majority voting,
the probability increases that it will have to make up its mind on a proposition
such that existing commitments imply that it should be resolved in one way (as
commitments on p, q, and r imply that the group should endorse p&q&r) but
the majority vote goes in the opposite direction. This would not be a problem
if the group could just ignore past judgments, treating them like the judgments
of a different subject. But of course the normal, democratically organized body
won’t be able to do this. It will be subject to expectations of diachronic as well
as synchronic consistency, both by its own members and by other groups and
individuals. Unless it sustains such expectations it won’t be able to display the
scrutable proﬁle of an agent; it won’t be able to commit itself to others in
promises, contracts, and the like; and it won’t be capable of being subjected to
a discipline of non-arbitrary decision making: for those over whom it exercises
authority it will have the aspect of a wayward force in their lives.
Solving the Problem
The problem posed by the impossibility theorem is not insurmountable, how-
ever. What the theorem shows, in effect, is that there may be ways in which a
group can form judgments that are reliably consistent, but they must breach
one or another of the presuppositions of the theorem. The group might avoid
the problem raised, for example, by renouncing the ideal of forming complete
judgments over all the issues it faces. It might decide to suspend judgment on
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one of any set of issues where majority voting would lead it into inconsistency.
This, however, won’t be a very satisfactory way of dealing with the difﬁculty.
The group will only be disposed to form judgments on issues related to the
choices or decisions it has to make, and any suspension of judgment is liable
to constrain its capacity for decision and action. A more promising line would
be for the group to avoid the problem raised, by taking steps that reduce its
commitment to universal domain, voter anonymity, or voting systematicity.
The group might try to reduce its commitment to universal domain by
imposing a discipline of deliberation designed to push individuals toward an
unproblematic conﬁguration of views: a conﬁguration that is unlikely to gen-
erate inconsistency on the basis of majority voting (List 2002). There is no
guarantee, however, that such a discipline can be identiﬁed and reliably imple-
mented. The more promising ways for a group to escape the problem would
be to reduce its commitment to either voter anonymity or voting systematic-
ity: either to the principle that every voter should be treated equally or to the
principle that every issue should be treated on its own merits.
The way in which most groups manage to conduct the formation of judg-
ment and the making of decisions is by breaching voter anonymity, giving
some individuals a special role. A common but extreme form of this is repre-
sented by how the shareholders in a company invest the board with the power
of making judgments in the company’s name, when the exercise of this power
can only be challenged with difﬁculty. The situation approximates the way in
which, according to Hobbes, the people in a commonwealth invest the sover-
eign with a more or less unconstrained power of judgment and decision mak-
ing. The alienation of such power may also take less extreme forms, of course.
It might consist, for example, in an arrangement whereby the members of a
group give one individual authority to decide the group’s judgments, should
inconsistencies arise from majority voting. The position of the courts in rela-
tion to a legislature can resemble that sort of regime, with the courts reinter-
preting what the legislature declares in order to ensure that its dictates come
out as consistent.
But while many groups maintain consistency in judgment by giving certain
parties special privileges in this way, the strategy cannot represent a natural
path for a group that is committed to participatory democracy, being disposed
to decide everything by majority vote. To give over authority to an individual
or subset of individuals, in however small a measure, is inevitably to diminish
the ideal of participatory democracy. It is to reduce the participation that
people enjoy in the decisions faced by the group.
This leaves only one strategy whereby a group might hope to ensure collec-
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tive consistency and yet remain true to the ideal of participatory democracy.
The strategy would consist in reducing the commitment to systematicity, and
allowing that on some issues the view of the group need not be decided by the
members’ views on that issue; it is to be decided, rather, by their views on
related issues. Think about the schematic case where A, B, and C vote in such
a way that the group is forced by majority voting to claim that p, that q, that r,
but that not-p&q&r. Were systematicity not enforced, then it would be possible
to have the group’s judgment on, say, p&q&r determined by member votes on
p, q, and r, rather than by member votes on the compound proposition itself;
and it would be possible to ensure consistency thereby in the group’s judgments
as a whole. Indeed the same holds for each proposition. Absent the require-
ment of systematicity, it would be possible to have the group’s judgment on any
of the four propositions determined by member votes on the other three,
thereby ensuring consistency. If the members vote ‘‘yes’’ for p, for q, and for p&
q&r, for example, then those votes will dictate a vote for not-q; and if systemat-
icity is not enforced, then this will be permissible.
What form, more positively, might the rejection of systematicity take? It is
one thing to say that inconsistency ceases to be inevitable if systematicity is
not enforced. It is quite another to identify tactics for determining where
systematicity should be breached and breached in a way that saves consis-
tency. There are two families of approaches. One would enforce a static proce-
dure, ﬁxed in advance for all cases. The other would invoke a more dynamic,
open-ended process.
Just to illustrate the static procedure, the group might decide to authorize
past judgments over present judgments in the case of any inconsistency aris-
ing from majority voting, and to let past judgments trump the present judg-
ment, regardless of the majority support it enjoys. Suppose that our group of
workers had committed to the ﬁrst three propositions in the matrix given,
prior to considering the issue of the pay sacriﬁce. This strategy would deny
them the possibility of reconsidering any of those past judgments in the light
of where, as it turns out, they lead: to acceptance of the pay sacriﬁce. It would
force the group to impose on itself procrustean, potentially irrational con-
straint. It would forbid any change of mind.
Still illustrating the static procedure, the group might decide to prioritize
more general issues over more speciﬁc ones, rather than issues addressed pre-
viously over issues under current consideration. It might decide that its judg-
ments on more general issues should determine its judgments on more
speciﬁc ones, whenever systematicity would lead to inconsistency. But this
again would be a costly approach to take. It would deny the group any possi-
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bility of following the method of reﬂective equilibrium described by John
Rawls (1971), since such equilibration consists in going back and forth be-
tween more general and more speciﬁc judgments, seeking out the best place
at which to make revisions and ensure coherence.
The basic problem with reducing the commitment to systematicity in any
such static manner is that it will require a group to prioritize certain judgment
types once for all time—more general judgments, for example, or judgments
addressed earlier—and to let them dictate what other judgments should be
endorsed. But this will often lead the group, intuitively, toward the wrong
views. Propositions do not come prepackaged into the more privileged issues
that ought to be decided ﬁrst and the less privileged issues that ought to be
decided by reference to the pattern of judgment in the privileged category. In
reasoning sensibly about what to believe we are often led as individuals to
revise past beliefs in the light of current inclinations (Harman 1986). It would
be crazy to deny ourselves in groups an exercise of intelligence that we prize
as individuals.
This takes us, ﬁnally, to the dynamic version of the strategy of rejecting
systematicity. The best way of summing this up may be to describe a set of
instructions whereby a group could be enabled to implement it. The instruc-
tions to the group might go as follows.
I. With every issue that comes up for judgment take a majority vote on
that issue and, as issues get progressively settled in this way, keep a
record of the accumulating body of judgments.
II. If majority voting on some issue generates inconsistency, treat the
judgment supported, and any judgments with which it is inconsis-
tent in the record, as candidates for reversal.
III. Identify those candidate judgments—say, the judgments that p, that
q, that r, and that not-p&q&r—and address the question of how to
resolve the inconsistency between them.
IV. If it turns out that some members have independently changed their
original opinion on some issue, ask whether this will resolve the in-
consistency, and if it does, go with the resulting set of judgments.
V. If the inconsistency is not resolved thereby, take a vote on where it
would be best to revise the judgments: whether, for example, to re-
vise the judgment that p, that q, that r, or that not-p&q&r.
VI. Take the proposition identiﬁed in this way, and hold another vote on
how the group should judge that proposition.
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VII. If the group reverses its previous judgment, treat the new verdict on
that proposition as the one to be endorsed by the group.
VIII. If the previous judgment is not reversed in that vote, go back to stage
III and try again.
IX. If it appears that there is no prospect of success in this process, try
to quarantine the inconsistency, and the area of decision it would
affect, so that it does not generate problems elsewhere.
X. If this quarantining is not possible, perhaps because the area of ac-
tion affected is important to the group’s aims, there is no alternative
but to disband; go your separate ways.
The approach prescribed in these instructions would escape the impossibility
theorem because it breaches the systematicity condition in the same way as
its static counterparts. So far as the approach is implemented—or at least
implemented beyond stage IV—there will be some issues decided on a basis
other than that of the majority position of members. If the members of our
working group were to follow this procedure, for example, and were to decide
that they ought to reverse the majority view on whether to have a pay sacriﬁce,
then the judgment on that issue would not be decided by reference to the
majority procedure followed with other issues. The issue about the pay sacri-
ﬁce would be determined, not in its own right, but on the basis of the views
of the group on the other three issues discussed.
This approach, or an approach in the same general family, is the only way I
see in which a group might realize the ideal of participatory democracy—the
ideal of conducting its business on the basis of a unanimously accepted pattern
of majority voting—and yet not fall afoul of the problem illustrated in the dis-
cursive dilemma. That is its great merit. The problem with the approach, of
course, is that it cannot be relied upon to produce a sureﬁre resolution. It may
lead the group to try to live with inconsistency, as in the quarantining option,
or it may lead the group to disband. And whether it is to lead in a negative
direction of that kind or along a more positive route may turn on nothing
more reliable than fortune. The chemistry between members, the resources of
rhetoric and persuasion available to them, or just the pressures under which
they operate may determine the extent to which the exercise succeeds. The
approach falls well short of an algorithm for participatory democracy.
The process may be deﬁcient in other respects too. It may be subject to
inﬂuence from the order in which issues happen to be taken, it may be vulner-
able to insincere voting on the part of more strategic members, it may repre-
sent only a fallible way of tracking the truth on the questions addressed. In
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short, it may be hostage to all the usual slings and arrows. But did we have
reason to expect anything else? This may still be as good as it gets.
We-thinking
The most striking way in which the process described falls short of being an
algorithmic decision procedure is in the room it makes for deliberation and
in the reliance that it is bound to place on deliberation at various points. It
makes room for deliberation not only at the point where each thinks about
how to judge and vote but also when a range of other issues come up. These
are issues to do with whether to revise that original judgment in light of the
opinions of others; what the best issue is on which to revise the group judg-
ment; how to vote personally on a proposition that is put up for revision; and
whether it may be possible to quarantine any inconsistencies that the group
cannot eliminate.
The deliberation accommodated at these loci may be more personal or
more communal; it may involve thinking to oneself or also, as in the normal
case, exchanging with others. But whatever form it takes, it must induce peo-
ple to think in terms of ‘‘we, the group’’ rather than ‘‘I, this member.’’ I con-
clude the paper with a discussion of that claim.
Any decision-making group that resolves issues of inconsistency along the
participatory line sketched in the last section—or indeed on many of the alter-
native lines—will constitute itself as a more or less autonomous group agent.
My claim about we-thinking is that in order to give life to that agent, the
members of the group will have to begin thinking, not just as executors of
their own personal attitudes, but also as executors of this distinct entity. They
will have to think in terms of a plural as well as a personal identity (Rovane
1997).
Let it be agreed that a group will constitute an agent or subject that is
distinct from its members so far as its intentional states get set up in a way
that makes them more or less independent from the intentional states of a
majority of members. Were the goals and judgments of the group just what-
ever goals and judgments happened to be espoused by a majority of the mem-
bers, then we might well think that talking of the group and its attitudes was
just a fancy way of talking about the majority attitudes among its members.
That is the sort of position adopted by many thinkers who have wanted to say
that the only true agents are individuals; that, in the words of John Austin,
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the nineteenth-century utilitarian, groups can be described as subjects ‘‘only
by ﬁgment, and for the sake of brevity of discussion’’ (Austin 1869, 364).
In a well-known discussion, Anthony Quinton (1975, 17) argues for pre-
cisely this point of view. He maintains that to ascribe judgments, intentions,
and the like to social groups is just a way of ascribing them, in a summative
manner, to individuals in those groups. And he denies, for that reason, that
there ever are group agents.
We do, of course, speak freely of the mental properties and acts of a
group in the way we do of individual people. Groups are said to have
beliefs, emotions, and attitudes and to take decisions and make
promises. But these ways of speaking are plainly metaphorical. To
ascribe mental predicates to a group is always an indirect way of
ascribing such predicates to its members. With such mental states
as beliefs and attitudes, the ascriptions are of what I have called a
summative kind. To say that the industrial working class is deter-
mined to resist anti–trade union laws is to say that all or most indus-
trial workers are so minded.
Our discussion of how a participatory decision-making body might come
to form and develop its goals and judgments gives the lie to this ‘‘singularist’’
view that there are no group agents; this view is criticized under that name by
Margaret Gilbert (1989, 12). For if we consider a group that has followed the
dynamic process of judgment formation described, we recognize that on pain
of having to live with inconsistency, it will almost inevitably have come to
form some judgments that do not correspond to the majority judgments of its
members; indeed it may even have come to form judgments that none of its
members endorses. Imagine for example that the workers in our example
come to accept that they as a group should give up the pay sacriﬁce. In that
case, they will endorse as a group a judgment that they all reject as individuals.
They will do so as a result of recognizing that if they are to hold together as a
group that does its business in an effective and rational manner, they will have
to make that sort of individual accommodation. They will have to be prepared
to condone the idea of the group’s holding by commitments that are rejected
at the personal level: rejected, not just by a minority of the members, but also
by a majority among the membership, even perhaps by every single individual.
Let it be granted, then, that the participatory democratic group is more or
less bound to develop this sort of autonomy, becoming a subject with distinct
attitudes and actions: a group with a mind of its own (Pettit 2003b). The
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thing to notice now is that if the members are to sustain those attitudes and
actions, enacting their shared mind, then they must put their individual iden-
tities aside, and must begin to think as a group. This is one sort of deliberative
thinking that they cannot avoid, whether or not they conduct the deliberation
in their own heads or—surely the natural course—in dialogue with others.
In order to emphasize the sort of identiﬁcation with the group that mem-
bers must develop, it may be useful to mark the way in which groups may fail
or falter on this front. I have discussed the topic elsewhere, under the title of
group akrasia: collective weakness of will (Pettit 2003a).
Imagine a noncommercial academic journal with an editorial committee
of three members that resolves all the issues it faces by majority vote. Suppose
that the committee votes in January for promising subscribers that there will
be no price rise within ﬁve years. Suppose that it votes in midyear that it will
send papers to external reviewers and be bound by their decision as to
whether or not to publish any individual piece. And suppose that in December
the committee faces the issue as to whether it should be just as prepared to
publish technical papers that involve costly typesetting as it is to publish other
papers. The earlier votes will argue against its being prepared to do this, since
a rise in the number of technical papers submitted and endorsed by review-
ers—endorsed, without any eye to overall production costs—might force it to
renege on one or other of those commitments. But nonetheless a majority
may support the acceptance of technical papers, without any individual being
in any way irrational. The members of the committee might vote as follows.
Price freeze? External review? Technical papers?
A. Yes No Yes
B. No Yes Yes
C. Yes Yes No
The group now faces a hard choice of precisely the kind we have been discuss-
ing. Suppose that they implement the participatory democratic process that
we characterized in the previous section. And suppose that they agree that the
issue on which the group should revise its view is that of whether to treat
technical papers on a par with other papers; they may vote unanimously that
it is impossible to revise its position on either of the other issues, perhaps
because the editorial position on those questions has already been made pub-
lic. How, then, may we expect the consequent vote to go?
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If members are individually devoted in a consuming, wholehearted way to
the group and are in no way tempted to defect from what it requires of them,
then of course they will each vote for offering less than equal treatment to
technical papers; they will reverse the previous group position. A group whose
members were dedicated in this way would operate like a perfectly virtuous
agent, always spontaneously supporting what the balance of available reasons
requires of the group. But not all members need be so devoted to the group in
which they ﬁgure; and when something less than full collective devotion is on
offer, then it may prove very difﬁcult for members to get their act together
and ensure that the group lives up to the considerations that it endorses.
Take the majority who originally supported an open policy on technical
papers. That majority may remain individually and stubbornly inclined to
support the acceptance of technical papers. We can imagine them turning
their eyes from the group as a whole, and sticking to their votes when the
issue is raised again. We can imagine them refusing to hear the call of the
group and acting like encapsulated centers of voting who are responsive only
to their own modular prompts. As we imagine this, we envisage the group
failing to reverse its judgment on the only issue where every member of the
group thinks it is possible to reverse judgment.
The recalcitrant majority in this sort of case might be moved by a more or
less selﬁsh inclination or identiﬁcation, being technically minded themselves,
or they might be moved by a sense of fairness toward those who would be
disadvantaged; personal virtue is as likely as personal vice to source recalci-
trance towards the collectivity. But could it really be rational for the recalci-
trant members to stick to a deviant pattern of voting, whether out of
individual bias or virtue? I don’t see why not. They would satisfy their private
motives, partial or impartial, by doing so. And they might individually expect
to get away with such voting, being outvoted by others; they might each expect
a free ride. Or they might hope that even if a majority remains recalcitrant,
this will not cause problems: there will not be a deluge in the number of
technical papers submitted and accepted, and the committee can get away
with holding by all of the three commitments involved.
The possibility of people remaining encapsulated in their personal identi-
ties in this way, and the danger that that holds out for the survival of the
group, shows why it is essential in general that the members should break of
out their capsules. If the group is to evolve as a center of agency, with a capac-
ity to be responsive to the demands of consistency, then it must be able to
discipline itself into holding only by certain patterns of judgment; it must be
able to regulate itself for the formation or maintenance only of judgments
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that cohere with one another. And if a group is to have that capacity, then its
members must be able to put their own views aside, identify with the group
as an independent center of intentionality, and then reason and act from the
perspective of that common center. They must be able to depart from normal,
I-centered patterns of thought and begin to think in terms the ‘‘we.’’
This brings our considerations to a close. We have seen that the ideal of
participatory democracy, as an ideal for a decision-making body, runs into
trouble with the discursive dilemma, and with the more general problem of
aggregating individual sets of judgments into a consistent, group-level set of
judgments. There is a way of overcoming that problem, as we saw in the last
section, that preserves the ideal of participatory democracy. But this, so we
have just seen, requires people to deliberate with themselves or one another
from the perspective of how we, the members of the group, see the world, not
from the perspective that is proper to each in their individual person.
With perhaps a different view in his sights, G. A. Cohen (1976, 66) inveighs
against the suggestion that one might be reasonably engulfed in a role to the
point of holding by certain judgments as an occupant of that role, but not in
one’s own right. ‘‘The propensity to engulfment should be resisted in theory
and in practice, for it poses a threat to the exercise of our freedom, and, ulti-
mately, some threat to freedom itself.’’ If the line of argument in this paper is
correct, then that is dead wrong. Few will deny the connection, however com-
plex, between the ideal of participatory democracy and the ideal of freedom.
And if my argument is right, then the only way to achieve participatory de-
mocracy in decision-making forums is precisely to persuade people that they
should lend their minds to the service of a group mind; they should learn to
think, not just in their own personal name, but in the name of any group in
which they democratically participate.
None of this should come as a surprise to those like Carole Pateman who
have emphasized the participatory point of view in politics. Participatory de-
mocracy requires people to cooperate, not just in the pursuit of common goals,
but in the pursuit of common goals according to common judgments. And
that sort of enterprise is more or less inevitably going to require members to
adopt the group point of view and to be prepared, at least in certain contexts,
to prioritize their group identity. Participatory democracy is not just a way in
which individuals combine to satisfy their existing goals, according to their
existing judgments; it is a way in which they combine to determine the goals
and judgments that they will enact together.
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